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SHADES OF LIFE IN INDIAN ABORTION LAW
CASE COMMENT

SHADES OF LIFE IN INDIAN ABORTION LAW
Gauri Pillai*
ABSTRACT

This case comment analyses the recent Kerala High Court decision in
Cry of Life Society v Union of India, where a petition was filed to declare
India's law on abortion unconstitutional for violating the right to life of the
foetus. The High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the constitutionality
of the legislation as protecting women's right to life. The author discusses the
High Court's order, narrowing in on the right to life argument used by the Court,
and the right to life argument that the Court missed. This analysis distills and
responds to the 'shades of life' underlying abortion law in India.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Cry for Life Society v Union of India,1 the Kerala High Court dealt with
a claim challenging the constitutionality of the Medical Termination of
Pregnancy Act 1971 ('MTPA') for violating the right to life of the foetus
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. The petitioners were societies
engaged in contesting 'foeticide under the cover of medical termination
of pregnancy', espousing the 'value of life and [the] agony of [the] unborn
child' .2 They claimed that life begins at conception, vesting the foetus with a
constitutional right to life. 3 This right can be taken away only in self-defence
or for self-preservation. Abortions are not acts of self-defence because the
foetus is not an aggressor. Aggression requires 'an act of will', an attribution
of responsibility: the foetus, in contrast, cannot be held responsible for its
own creation, which is a biological act beyond its control. 4 Self-preservation
can be exercised only if the life of the individual is in danger; in 'normal
cases' of pregnancy, the life of the pregnant woman is not in danger.5 The
MTPA, the petitioners argued, was thus unconstitutional to the extent that
it allowed abortions in situations where the woman's life was not in 'grave
and imminent' danger. 6
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The KeralaHigh Court dismissed the petition and upheld the constitutionality
of the MTPA. The petitioners have recently filed an appeal in the Supreme
Court against the Kerala High Court decision,7 making it an apt moment to
revisit the case. In this case comment, I discuss the Kerala High Court's
judgement to draw out the shades of life discernible within abortion law
in India. The petitioners' arguments represent one shade: foetal life. The
Kerala High Court's response represents a second shade: women's right
to life.
In Part II, I set out how the Court developed women' s right to life to dismiss
the petitioners' claims. I argue that while the Court's right to life framing
is helpful, it offers an inadequate basis to constitutionally ground the right
to abortion. In Part III, I argue that in failing to engage with the question of
foetal life, the Court left the crux of the petitioners' claim unaddressed. It
also missed an opportunity to develop Indian abortion law's response to the
role of foetal interests in limiting abortion.
IL THE COURT'S 'LIFE' .ARGUMENT

In asking if the MTPA is compliant with Article 21, the Kerala High Court
focused on women' s right to life. The Court identified that the object of
the MTPA is to 'save and protect the life of pregnant women' .8 The Court
held that 'life' is to be interpreted not as threat to life potentially causing
death-a restrictive interpretation of 'life' limited to survival-but also as
threats to the physical 9 and mental health10 of the pregnant woman. If so,
the provisions of the MTPA that allow abortion in circumstances beyond
'grave and imminent' danger to women's life-that is, those permitting
termination on account of 'grave injury' to women's physical and mental
health1Lare 'proportionate to the object sought to be achieved', and thus
constitutional under Article 21' s right to life clause. 12
The Court's right to life argument is crucial. At the outset, it preserves the
constitutionality of the MTPA, shielding it against the petitioners' claims.
The Court's reading also presents an expansive interpretation of 'life'
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within abortion law, in line with broader constitutional jurisprudence
under Article 21, guaranteeing not just a right to survival but also a right to
physical and mental health.13 Moreover, right to life arguments have been
mobilised elsewhere to reduce public opposition to abortion in light of foetal
interests; 14 they could perform a similar function in India. Finally, right to
life arguments are especially important in a global legal climate where even
provisions allowing abortion to save the life of pregnant women are under
threat. 15
However, on principle, the Court' s endorsement of the right to life alone
as the constitutional basis for abortion under Article 21 leaves much to be
desired. Article 21 protects both the right to life and the right to personal
liberty. 16 As the Constituent Assembly Debates note, the 'sacredness and
sanctity of personal liberty' 17 is a product of the 'inviolable' personality
of an individual. 18 As a result, the right to personal liberty under Article 21
preserves for each individual 'a zone of choice and self-determination',
recognising their ability to 'make choices and to take decisions governing
matters intimate and personal' ,19 including 'whether to bear a child or
abort her pregnancy' .20 The MTPA infringes on personal liberty by allowing
abortion only under fixed conditions, within specified time limits, and on
sanction by medical professionals. 21 Simply put, a woman cannot access
an abortion based on her own assessment of the harm from continuation
of pregnancy. Yet, the Court's framing on abortion, being rooted only in
the right to life, endorses this denial of personal liberty. This is evident
in its observation: 'it cannot be said that everyone, who is not interested
13
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to continue with the pregnancy, is entitled as of right, to seek medical
termination of pregnancy on any grounds other than the one mentioned
under Section 3 of the [MTPA]' .22 The Court's grounding of abortion
within the right to life thus de-emphasises the role of personal liberty within
Article 21' s guarantee of right to life and personal liberty. 23 It also fails to
recognise the close connection, in the abortion context, between the denial
of personal liberty and the denial of life. Restrictions on abortion (which
deny personal liberty) often compel women to seek abortions outside the
healthcare system, with backstreet abortion providers. This causes mortality
and morbidity amongst women, harming life and health. 24 In other words, the
denial of personal liberty leads, in effect, to a denial of life. In ignoring this
connection, the Court comes to the unfortunate conclusion that the MTPA
is not just necessary-to preserve life-but also sufficient (or proportionate)
under Article 21.
III. THE MISSING 'LIFE' ARGUMENT

The Court' s reliance on women' s right to life is inadequate for a second
reason. It fails to engage with the petitioners' claims on foetal right to life.
The petitioners argue that the foetus has a right to life from conception.
They rely on the Hindu Succession Act 1956 ( 'HSA') where the unborn
child is entitled to a share in the property of the Hindu undivided family 25
to suggest that Indian law recognises foetal right to life: 'There can be no
right to property without an attached right to life' .26 However, the relevant
provision under the HSA makes clear that only '[a] child who was in the
womb at the time of the death of an intestate and who is subsequently born
alive shall have the same right to inherit to the intestate' . This implies that
the right to inherit property vests only after the birth of the child, indicating
that the foetus, before birth, has neither the right to property, nor the right to
life. The petitioners also argue that international human rights law protects
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Cry for Life (n 1) 27.
This is reflective of a general critique of right to life arguments for abortion for failing to affirm
reproductive autonomy: See Catherine Albertyn, 'Abortion, Reproductive Rights and the
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'Induced Abortion: Incidence and Trends Worldwide from 1995 to 2008' (2012) 379 The Lancet
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1908.
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life before birth. 27 This claim is legally incorrect: international human rights
law 'clearly rejects claims that human rights should attach from conception
or any time before birth' .28 As I argue elsewhere, abortion law in India also
does not recognise foetal right to life at any stage of gestation; 29 at best, it
recognises a 'compelling State interest' in protecting the 'prospective
child' or the 'potentiality of human life' .30 The Court thus ought to have
rejected the petitioners' arguments on foetal life right at the outset.
Moreover, had the Court explicitly responded to the petitioners' claims, it
could have assessed whether legal restrictions on abortion are suitable and
necessary to protect foetal potentiality. Suitability and necessity are two
prongs of the four-part proportionality test, 31 which the Court correctly
identified as applicable in this case.32 Suitability asks whether the means the
State adopts to pursue a given legitimate aim are appropriate in achieving
the aim. Necessity asks if the means, even when appropriate, are required to
achieve the aim; or, are there alternate means which can achieve the same
aim to a 'real and substantial' extent?33
Here, as per the petitioners' arguments, the aim is to protect foetal
potentiality (incorrectly identified as foetal right to life). The suggested
means is to prohibit abortion within law, except in cases where the pregnant
woman's life is in 'grave and imminent' danger. For these means to be
consistent with proportionality, legally prohibiting abortion has to be both
suitable and necessary to protect foetal potentiality. In this case, it is neither.
A legal prohibition on abortion does not actually reduce the number of
abortions (and thereby protect foetuses). It simply pushes women seeking
abortions towards unsafe abortion providers, 34 harming both foetuses and
women. Thus, prohibiting abortion within the law is not a suitable means of
achieving the aim of protecting the foetus. It is also not a necessary means,
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as there exist alternate steps that the State can adopt to achieve the same
aim. In legally restricting abortion, the State attempts to reduce the number
of abortions (seemingly) to protect foetuses. The State can, alternatively,
achieve this end by lowering the very need for abortions by targeting the
root causes of abortions in India: lack of access to temporary contraception, 35
violence against women and girls, 36 and lack of State support for parenting. 37
In fact,
there is a wealth of evidence that suggests that a concern for protecting
[foetal] life can be more effectively pursued through policies that
attack the incidence of unwanted pregnancy (for example, through
improving the quality of sex education and contraceptive provision,
and making motherhood a more realistic possibility for women
struggling to balance childcare alongside other commitments). 38
Despite this, an insistence on restricting abortion as the means to protect
foetal potentiality suggests that:
the underlying rationale.. .is not-or at least not only-the protection
of the [foetal] right to life, but something less articulated and more
difficult to grasp...conceptions on gender relations and the place of
women in society. 39
The petitioners' arguments in this case offered the Court a perfect
opportunity to raise these questions, and flush out pernicious assumptions
about women that typically underlie restrictions on abortion.40 These
assumptions are suspect under the constitutional prohibition on sex
35
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discrimination.41 In evading the question of foetal right to life by focusing
on women' s right to life, the Court thus missed an opportunity to develop
Indian abortion law' s response to the role of foetal interests in limiting
women' s right to abortion. The stage, then, is set for the Supreme Court.
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